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Abstract
To be the lowest bidders in procurement auctions, contractors commonly solicit sub-
contract bids at the bid preparation stage. In this research, we establish a model of a
two-stage procurement auction to analyze such pre-award upstream competitions included
in procurement auctions. Our main ﬁndings include the following: i) ﬁrst-price upstream
auctions dominate second-price upstream auctions in terms of allocative eﬃciency and
procurement cost; ii) neither a ﬁrst- nor a second-price auction in upstream competitions
implements an optimal outcome; and iii) the ex post negotiation between the prime and
subcontractors improves the performance of second-price auctions in upstream competi-
tions. We show that the optimal outcome is implemented with the use of the negotiated
second-price auctions in upstream competitions.
Key words: procurement auctions, subcontracting, optimal mechanism
JEL classiﬁcation: D44, H57, L42
1 Introduction
Subcontracting and outsourcing are common business practices in procurement markets. In a
highway construction project, for instance, the winning bidder may subcontract road marking
or signal work to specialty ﬁrms. In addition, the contractor may purchase raw materials or
equipment from other sources, which can also be considered subcontracting in the broader
sense. For prime contractors, it is not unusual that the bulk of the cost of a large construction
project that covers a wide range of work consists of subcontract payments.
To obtain qualiﬁed subcontracts at fair prices, prime contractors (PCs) commonly ask
subcontractors (SCs) to bid irrevocable price quotes (subcontract bids) prior to submitting a
bid in the procurement auction (Clough and sears (1994), Dyer and Kagel (1996), Marechal
and Morand (2003), Grosskopf and Medina (2007)). This practice also satisﬁes a PC’s need to
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1obtain the cost estimate for bidding.1 In this sense, PCs are not only bidders in the downstream
procurement auction but also auctioneers in the upstream subcontract auction.
The objective of this paper is to analyze such pre-award upstream auctions included in the
procurement auction. We established a model of a two-stage procurement auction in which a
procurement buyer auctions oﬀ a project for bidders (PCs). In the ﬁrst stage, each PC solicits
subcontract bids from a set of SCs, where the PC is assumed to know the distribution but
not the values of the SCs’ costs to complete the subcontractable work. If the PC selects an
SC, the PC makes a pre-award subcontract agreement with the SC that speciﬁes the amount
of the subcontract payment from PC to the winner SC. In the second stage, the PC bids in
the procurement auction with private value assumption, given that his cost is the sum of the
subcontract payment plus his own cost to complete the remaining non-subcontractable work
for himself.
We demonstrate that the use of second-price auctions in upstream competitions results
likely in ex post ineﬃcient allocation and a higher procurement cost than the use of ﬁrst-price
auctions. However, the defects of second-price upstream auctions are resolved by introducing
an ex post negotiation between the winner PC and sc on the subcontract payment contingent
on the outcome in the downstream auction. We show that, with the ex post negotiation,
second-price auctions in upstream competitions implement an optimal outcome in procurement
auctions with subcontracting.
The closest works related to this research are Hansen (1988) and Wambach (2009), which
show the failure of the revenue equivalence in upstream auctions assuming that the outcome
of the downstream market is reduced into a downward-sloping demand curve. Due to mod-
eling the downstream auction, in this study, non-trivial extensions are made to their results,
including optimal design and eﬃciency analysis in multi-layered procurement.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
of procurement auctions with pre-award subcontracting. Section 3 examines the equilibrium
bidding behavior in upstream auctions. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium in the downstream
auction. Section 5 provides a general model in which PCs are heterogeneous, and Section 6 is
the conclusion.
2 The model
Consider a procurement auction in which a procurement buyer solicits bids from N risk-neutral
prime contractors (PCs), each denoted by i ∈{ 1,...,N}, to purchase a project. The value of
the project to the procurement buyer is equal to V . The procurement buyer sets a reservation
price r in the procurement auction so that any bid above r is rejected.
1Furthermore, some procurement buyers require PCs to submit a proposed subcontracting plan that must
be approved by the contracting oﬃcer prior to bidding. For instance, the state of Oregon requires bidders in
public projects to submit a list of ﬁrst-tier subcontractors and their subcontract bids if the amount of the bid
is greater than ﬁve percent of the total project bid or $15,000 (ORS 279C.370).
2We assume that the work to complete the project consists of two components, the subcon-
tractable and the non-subcontractable work, and the share of the two components is given and
identical for all PCs. Prior to submitting a bid in the procurement auction, each PC solicits
subcontract bids from n risk-neutral subcontractors (SCs), denoted by {SCi,1,...,SCi,n}.
Prior to being solicited by a PC, each SC draws his cost t to perform the subcontract. The
cost t has a commonly known atomless distribution Ft with support [t
¯
,¯ t]. The cost of PC to
complete the subcontractable work for himself is inﬁnitely large, and PCs always subcontract
so that reserve prices in upstream auctions are never below ¯ t. The cost of the PC to complete
the remaining non-subcontractable work is normalized to be equal to zero.2
The entire game consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, N upstream auctions occur, and
the downstream auction takes place in the second stage. In the ﬁrst stage, SC (i,j) obtains
his cost ti,j and submits a subcontract bid si,j to PC i in an upstream auction i. An SC will
be selected as a winner SC and make a subcontract agreement with PC i,w h i c hs p e c i ﬁ e st h e
amount of a conditional subcontract payment ci from PC i to the SC.3 In the second stage,
PC i submits a bid bi in the downstream auction with reservation price r given that his cost
is equal to ci.
Throughout this paper, we assume private values. The cost of SC (i,j) is known only to
him, and the cost of PC i is known only to PC i. For the regularity condition, Ft(·) satisﬁes
log-concavity i.e., f￿
t(t)/ft(t) is non-increasing.
An optimal outcome in the double-layered procurement can be characterized by consid-
ering the situation in which each PC vertically integrates n SCs and bids for the procure-
ment contract. Deﬁne wi ≡ min{ti,1,...,t i,n}. The cumulative distribution function of wi is
given by Fw(w)=1− [1 − Ft(w)]n. Then, due to Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Myerson
(1981), an optimal outcome is identiﬁed such that the procurement contract is allocated to
the lowest-cost integrated ﬁrm whose cost is lower than the reservation price r∗ such that
r∗ = V − Fw(r∗)/fw(r∗). Taking the optimal outcome as a benchmark, we discuss how it can
be implemented through layered procurement auctions.
3 Equilibrium in upstream auctions
If second-price auctions are used in upstream competitions, the subcontract bid only deter-
mines the SC’s winning probability but not the payoﬀ conditional on winning.4 Hence, as in
the case of standard procurement auctions, submitting s = ti,j is a dominant strategy for the
SC in the second-price subcontract auction.5
2The discussion in which the assumption is relaxed is delivered in Section 5.
3The payment ci is conditional because it is paid if the PC i indeed wins in the downstream auction.
4In this setting, revenue equivalence holds between an English (ascending) auction and a Vickery (second-
price sealed-bid) auction.
5Let B denote the lowest competing bid in the upstream auction. By bidding ti,j,t h eb i d d e rw i l lw i ni f
ti,j <Band not if ti,j >B . Suppose, however, that he bids an amount ti,j <z .I fti,j <z≤ B,t h e nh es t i l l
wins in the upstream auction, and his proﬁt is still ti,j − B if the PC wins in the downstream competition.
However, if ti,j <B<z , then he loses, whereas, if he had bid ti,j, he would have made a positive proﬁt
3To examine the case of ﬁrst-price auctions used in upstream competitions, we restrict our
attention to a symmetric increasing equilibrium in which all SCs follow an increasing strategy
σ(·) and all PCs follow an increasing strategy β(·). Let ti,(j:n) be the cost of the jth lowest-cost
SC solicited by PC i. The cost of PC i is then given by ci = σ(ti,(1:n)). To obtain σ, consider
the situation in which all SCs other than SC (i,j) follow σ and that in which all PCs follow β.
If SC (i,j), j =1 ,...,n,b i d ss to PC i,S C( i,j) wins the upstream auction with probability:
P(s)=[ 1− Ft(σ−1(s))]n−1.
Having his cost ci equal to s,P Ci wins in the downstream auction if and only if ci is lower
than that of all the N − 1 rivals and reservation price r in the downstream auction. Hence,
provided that SC (i,j) wins in upstream auction i, the conditional probability that PC i wins
in the downstream competition is given by6
Q (s|N,r)=[ 1− Ft(σ−1(s))]n(N−1)1{s≤r}.
SCs receive positive payoﬀs with probability P(·)Q(·). Hence, the objective function is given
by
π(ti,j|N,r) = max














Let t(1:N)(j:n) be the cost of the jth lowest-cost SC solicited by the winner PC. Then, the
expected subcontract price is equal to E[σ(t(1:N)(1:n)|N,r)]. On the other hand, the expected
subcontract price is equal to E[t(1:N)(2:n)] when second-price auctions are used in upstream
competitions. Hence, the following lemma is established regarding the expected winning bid
in the upstream auction, which extends the results of Hansen (1988) and Wambach (2009) to
the model of multi-stage auctions.
Lemma 1. Subcontract prices are lower when ﬁrst-price auctions are used than when second-
price auctions are used in upstream competitions, namely,
E[σ(t(1:N)(1:n)|N,r)] ≤ E[t(1:N)(2:n)].
conditional on the PC’s success in the downstream competition. Thus, bidding less than ti,j can never increase
his proﬁt but, in some occasions, may in fact decrease it. A similar argument shows that it is not proﬁtable to
bid less than ti,j.
6The decreasing function Q(s|·) is a reminder of the decreasing function q(·) in Hansen (1988) representing
the downstream demand schedule.
4Proof. Let t(2:N)(j:n) be the cost of the jth lowest-cost SC solicited by the lowest rival PC
of the winner in the downstream auction. Equation (1) suggests that, for any t(1:N)(1:n),t h e
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never exceeds the conditional expectation of the subcontract price in the second-price upstream
auction, E[t(1:N)(2:n)|t(1:N)(1:n)].
Three observations are particularly noteworthy. First, if ﬁrst-price auctions are used in
upstream auctions, each SC bids as if all other SCs, including the ones bidding for other PCs,
were also his rival. Thus, the expected subcontract price declines as N rises or r falls. The
equivalence of the expected subcontract price holds only when N = 1 and r ≥ ¯ t.7
Second, PCs using a ﬁrst-price auction for the upstream competition have stronger bargain-
ing power against SCs as the number of rival PCs increases or the reservation price falls in the
downstream auction.8 This suggests that ﬁrst-price auctions in upstream competitions allow
PCs to share the risk with SCs of uncertainty in the downstream market, while second-price
upstream auctions do not.
Finally, the mechanism of the upstream auctions inﬂuences the allocative eﬃciency. In the
symmetric equilibrium under the ﬁrst-price upstream competitions, the lowest-cost SC in the
upstream market always receives the subcontract. However, if second-price auctions are used
in upstream competitions, the lowest-cost SC misses the subcontract if the cost of his lowest
rival SC is higher than the cost of the second-lowest-cost SC in another upstream auction.
Hence, the following theorem is established regarding allocative eﬃciency.
Theorem 1. The use of a second-price auction in upstream competitions likely leads to an
ineﬃcient allocation.
As a simple example, suppose that N = 2, n = 2, and m = 0 (no common SC). If t1,(1:n)
is the lowest-cost SC, possible realizations of SC’s costs are
R1 : t1,(1:n) <t 1,(2:n) <t 2,(1:n) <t 2,(2:n),
R2 : t1,(1:n) <t 2,(1:n) <t 1,(2:n) <t 2,(2:n),
R3 : t1,(1:n) <t 2,(1:n) <t 2,(2:n) <t 1,(2:n).
7If the winner PC solicits SCs after the downstream competition, the outcome is equivalent to the case
with N =1a n dr ≥ ¯ r, in which the equivalence in the expected subcontract price holds. Hence, pre-award
subcontracting with the use of ﬁrst-price auctions dominates the post-award subcontracting conducted with
any mechanism from the viewpoint of lowering the subcontract price.
8This result holds even if some SCs bid to multiple PCs. As shown in Appendix A, the SC’s bidding strategy
is identical regardless of whether the SC bids exclusively to a single PC or bids simultaneously to multiple PCs.
Thus, although the multiple-bidding SC does not care which PC wins, the SC is induced to bid a lower price
by the aggressive bids of exclusively bidding SCs.
5Since ts are i.i.d. samples, each of these realizations, {R1,R2,R3}, occurs with probability 1/3.
Thus, if second-price auctions are used in all upstream competitions, an ineﬃcient outcome
results with probability 1/3.
When R3 occurs, the most eﬃcient SC may beneﬁcially negotiate with the PC to undercut
the subcontract payment slightly below t2,(2:n). The oﬀer expands the chance of obtaining
a positive payoﬀ for the lowest SC but never reduces the PC’s payoﬀ. Thus, the use of a
second-price auction with negotiation weakly dominates the use of the standard second-price
auction for both the PC and the winning SC.
In fact, the ex post negotiation between PCs and SCs resolves the disadvantage of the
second-price subcontract auction in revenue and eﬃciency. Suppose that the downstream
contest takes place with a second-price auction. Let b−i be the lowest bid of i’s rival PCs in the
downstream competition. After the negotiation, the winning PC’s subcontract payment will be
min{ti,(2:n),b −i,r}. Thus, a weakly dominant strategy of PC i in the downstream auction is to
submit bi = ti,(1:n).9 Therefore, i’s payoﬀ when winning is min{b−i,r}−ti,(2:n) if min{b−i,r}−
ti,(2:n) > 0 or zero otherwise. Because the amount of the subcontract payment depends on the
lowest-rival bid in the downstream competition, the mechanism of the downstream competition
must be a second-price auction.
Two observations were then made. First, the negotiated second-price subcontract auction
always results in an ex post eﬃcient allocation, since the PC receiving the oﬀer from the
lowest-cost SC always wins in the downstream competition. Second, if all PCs use a second-
price auction with ex post negotiation, the subcontract price equals the second-lowest cost of
all n × N SCs. Hence, in the winning PC’s upstream auction, the expected subcontract price
equivalent holds between a ﬁrst-price and the negotiated second-price auctions.
Since all the beneﬁt from the negotiation belongs to SCs, the negotiated second-price
upstream auction may need regulation that restricts the freedom of PCs to choose the mecha-
nism in the upstream market. It follows that cost-minimizing procurement buyers should not
entirely delegate subcontracting to PCs.
4 The downstream auction
Let Fc(·) be the distribution of the PC’s cost. If a second-price auction is used in upstream
auctions, then
Fc(c|SP) = 1 − n(n − 1)Ft(c)ft(c)[1 − Ft(c)]n−2.
9Since PC i receives a positive payoﬀ if and only if b−i >t i,(2:n),a n yb i db ∈ [ti,(1:n),t i,(2:n)] creates the
same expected payoﬀ for PC i.
6If ﬁrst-price auctions are used in upstream competitions and all SCs follow the symmetric
equilibrium σ, the PC’s cost distribution is given by
Fc(σ(t|N,r)|N,r,FP) = 1 − nft(t)[1 − Ft(t)]n−1. (2)
Hence, the distribution is endogenous in N and r only when ﬁrst-price auctions are used in
upstream auctions. Recall that σ(t|N,r) declines as N rises or r falls. Since the right-hand
side in Equation (2) is constant with respect to N and r, Fc(·|N,r) rises as N rises or r falls.
It follows that, if ﬁrst-price auctions are used in upstream competitions, the distribution of
the bidders’ private information in the downstream competition shifts to the right in the sense
of the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance as the number of bidders decreases or the reservation
price increases.
The results have impacts on the theoretical and empirical auction models that crucially
depend on the assumption that the distribution of private information is independent of the
mechanism and the number of agents. For instance, the cost-minimizing reservation price in
the downstream auction must be a function of the number of bidders if the upstream contests
are conducted through ﬁrst-price auctions. In addition, the pseudo-values estimated from
the structural estimation of auctions must be pooled separately according to the number of
bidders to obtain the distribution. For instance, the cost distribution is lower-shifted if the
number of bidders in the sample auction is greater than the average. Hence, the estimated
cost distribution would be biased upward unless the estimation is conducted separately from
that using the pseudo-values obtained from the auction data with a larger number of bidders.
Despite the endogeneity, the distribution of the bidder in the downstream auction is i.i.d..
Hence, the downstream auction is revenue-equivalent if all upstream competitions use either a
ﬁrst- or second-price auction. Using the result, we obtained the following theorem regarding
the procurement cost.
Theorem 2. The use of ﬁrst-price auctions in upstream competitions lowers the procurement
cost more signiﬁcantly than the use of second-price auctions.
Proof. Let t(2:N)(j:n) be the jth lowest cost of n SCs solicited by the second-lowest PC. The
cost of the second-lowest PC is equal to σ(t(2:N)(1:n)|N,r) if ﬁrst-price auctions are used
in all upstream auctions, whereas it equals min{t(2:N)(2:n),r} if second-price auctions are
used. By Lemma 1, σ(t(2:N)(1:n)) ≤ E[t(2:N)(2:N)], which entails that σ(t(2:N)(1:n)|N,r) ≤
min{t(2:N)(2:N),r} for any r. Hence, if a second-price auction is used in the downstream auc-
tion, the use of ﬁrst-price auctions in upstream competitions lowers the procurement cost more
signiﬁcantly than the use of second-price auctions. Revenue equivalence in the downstream
competition generalizes the result for any mechanism of downstream competition.
Besides, if the ex post negotiation is possible in all upstream competitions with the form of
second-price auctions, the bid of the lowest losing PC is t(2:N)(1:n), whereas it is σ(t(2:N)(1:n))
if ﬁrst-price auctions are used in the upstream market. Hence, if the downstream competition
7is restricted to a second-price auction, the ex post negotiation in a second-price subcontract
auction further reduces the procurement cost.
In fact, with the use of a reservation price in the downstream auction, the procurement
cost is minimized.
Theorem 3. Let Fw be the cumulative distribution function of wi =m i n {ti,1,...,t i,n}.I fu p -
stream competitions take place with the use of a negotiated second-price auction, the procure-
ment buyer implements the optimal outcome by using a second-price auction with reservation
price r∗ such that r∗ = V − Fw(r∗)/fw(r∗) in the downstream competition.
Proof. The PC wins if the cost of his lowest-cost SC is t(1:N)(1:n) and t(1:N)(1:n) <r ∗.I n
addition, the winner PC receives a payment equal to min{t(2:N)(1:n),r∗}. Thus, both allocation
and payment rules are identical to the optimal outcome characterized in Section 2.
The intuitions behind these results are threefold. First, the ex post negotiation between
the PC and SC eliminates the double marginalization problem. The expected aggregate infor-
mational rents obtained by both winner PC and SC always coincide with the expected payoﬀ
of the winning integrated ﬁrm in the optimal outcome observed in Section 2. This also implies
that the negotiation realizes the optimal risk sharing between the PC and SC on uncertainty
of the downstream competition by limiting the informational rent accrued to both PC and
SC. Furthermore, the reservation price r∗ is independent of N, similar to the case in which
PCs vertically integrate SCs. Due to the double marginalization problem, the cost-minimizing
reservation price in the case of ﬁrst-price auctions used in upstream competitions coincides
with r∗ only when N approaches inﬁnity.
Second, to implement the dominant strategy equilibrium, procurement buyers may need
to give an ￿ small amount of transfer to the winner PC so that PCs bid the cost of the lowest
SC solicited in the upstream auction. For PC i, submitting any bid between ti,(1:n) and ti,(2:n)
yields the same expected proﬁt. The transfer, if any, induces PC i to bid the lowest amount
ti,(1:n), in which the winning probability is maximized. As ￿ approaches zero, the expected
procurement cost is identical to that in the optimal outcome characterized in Section 2.
Finally, the ex post negotiation requires the downstream competition to be conducted with
the second-price auction format. Thus, if a ﬁrst-price auction must be used in the downstream
competition, ﬁrst-price auctions are the second-best mechanism in upstream competitions from
the viewpoint of cost minimization. In this case, the procurement cost falls as the number
of PCs increases even if the total number of SCs in the upstream market is ﬁxed.10 Thus,
10Let Z ≡ n×N,a n dl e tt(j) be the jth lowest-order statistic among Zi . i . d .samples. Suppose also that the
downstream competition takes place with a second-price auction. Then, the probability that the procurement
cost is equal to or above σ(t(j))i s
￿j−2
k=1(n − k)/(Z − 1) for all j =3 ,...,n+ 1, and the probability that
the procurement cost equals σ(t2)i s( Z − n)/(Z − 1). Given Z, the probability is increasing in n for any
j =3 ,...,n+ 1 and decreasing in n for j = 2. Hence, the distribution of the procurement cost given n is
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominated by the distribution given ˆ n>n . Since the SC’s strategy and their expected
payoﬀs are unchanged, the severer competition in the downstream market extracts more rents only from PCs.
8the optimal number of PCs is equal to the number of SCs in the upstream market if the
downstream competition uses a ﬁrst-price auction.
5 The noise term in PC’s costs
In this section, we brieﬂy investigate the case in which PCs have heterogeneity in the produc-
tion cost to complete the non-subcontractable work. Let θi be the cost of PC i, i =1 ,...,N to
complete the work. Then, PC i’s total cost ci is the sum of θi plus the subcontract payment.
Let Fθ(·) be the commonly known atomless distribution of θ with support [θ
¯
, ¯ θ] and let fθ be
its density. As for regularity condition, fθ is log-concave.
The SC’s dominant strategy is still to bid his cost if a second-price auction is used in
the upstream competition. On the other hand, suppose that upstream competitions use ﬁrst-
price auctions. Then, if all other SCs follow σ, P(s)=
￿
1 − Ft(σ−1(s))
￿n−1 1{s≤¯ t} is the
probability that SC (i,j) will win in upstream auction i when his bid is equal to s. In addition,
Q(s|N,r,σ−i) is the conditional probability that PC i wins in the downstream auction given
that SC (i,j) wins in upstream auction i,w h e r eσ−i is the strategy proﬁle of n×(N −1) SCs
who bid for PCs except i.T h u s ,S C( i,j)’s objective function in equilibrium is given as
π(ti,j|N,r,σ−i) = max




To obtain Q(·), we ﬁrst examine the probability that the PC i’s total cost ci is lower
than another PC’s cost, provided that the PC i’s cost for non-subcontractable work equals
θi and the selected subcontract bid equals s. The convolution theorem gives the cumulative
distribution function of ci by





n−1 [1 − Fθ(s + θi − σ(t|·))]dt.
Since the number of PCs equals N, the probability that PC i will win in the downstream





[1 − Fc(s + θi|σ)]
N−1 fθ(θi)dθi, (4)





[1 − Fc(s + θi|σ)]
N−1 f￿
θ(θi)dθi (5)
if N>1 and Q￿ =0i fN = 1, implying that Q is decreasing in s.
To identify a symmetric increasing equilibrium of the SC’s strategy σ, the derivative of (3)
9is taken with respect to s. Suppressing subscripts and replacing σ−1(s|·)=t yield
1
σ(t|N,r) − t









This equation holds for any ˆ t ∈ [t
¯
,¯ t] in equilibrium. Thus, the integral is taken from t through
¯ t, and the integration by parts is used on the right-hand side to obtain
σ(t|N,r)=t +
￿ ¯ t
t [1 − Ft(ˆ t)]n−1Q(σ(ˆ t|·)|N,r,σ−i)dˆ t
[1 − Ft(t)]n−1Q(σ(t|·)|N,r,σ−i)
. (7)
Solving this for σ(t|·) gives the SC’s bidding function. Although not a closed form, many
insights are drawn from (7). First, for any non-increasing function Q(·), σ is strictly increasing.
Second, Lemma 1 still holds: the optimal bidding strategy is to bid the next lowest cost
conditional both on the SC’s winning in the upstream auction bid and on the PC’s winning
in the downstream auction.11 Finally, the SC’s bidding strategy σ is a function of the number
of PCs and the reservation price in the downstream auction. The hazard function of Q is
increasing in N and decreasing in the reservation price r (see Appendix B). Furthermore, the
SC’s two bidding functions with diﬀerent numbers of bidders or diﬀerent reservation prices
never cross each other for any t<¯ t (see Appendix C). Hence, Lemma 1 holds even if θ is a
random variable (see Appendix D).
Theorem 1 can hold when θ is random. For simplicity, we assume that N = 2, n = 2, and
m = 0. Suppose that σ(ti,(1:n)) and θ have the same distribution, namely, Fθ(θ)=1− [1 −
Ft(σ−1(θ))]2. Then, the probability that both σ(t1,(1:n)) <σ (t2,(1:n)) and σ(t1,(1:n))+θ1 >
σ(t2,(1:n))+θ2 occur is 0.25,12 implying that an ineﬃcient allocation occurs with probability
0.25 in ﬁrst-price upstream auctions. In contrast, if a second-price auction is used in upstream
auctions, the probability of an ineﬃcient allocation occurring is strictly more than 0.33. Hence,
the advantage of the ﬁrst-price auction in terms of allocative eﬃciency is maintained even when
unobserved heterogeneity exists in the PC’s cost to complete the non-subcontractable work.
11Equation (7) is rearranged as
σ(t|N,r)=
￿ ¯ t















The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the expected cost of the lowest rival SC in the upstream auction
conditional on SC’s winning and PC i’s winning. The second term is the conditional expected cost of PC i’s
lowest rival PCs.
12Let µ = t1,(1:n) − t2,(1:n),a n dl e tξ = θ1 − θ2.L e tFξ(·) be the cumulative distribution function for these
random variables. By construction, both µ and ξ have a mean of zero, and Fξ is symmetric so that Fξ(0) = 0.5.

















=0 .5, P =0 .25.
10Theorem 2 holds since ci = θi + σ(ti,(1:n)) is an i.i.d. random variable and the revenue
equivalence holds in the downstream auction. As for Theorem 3, deﬁne the optimal allocation
as the one in which integrated ﬁrm i wins if his total cost ci is the lowest and does not exceed
r∗ such that r∗ = V − Fc(r∗)/fc(r∗), where Fc(·) is the cumulative distribution function of
ci. Suppose that the downstream competition takes place with a second-price auction and the
upstream competitions are on the basis of a second-price auction with the ex post negotiation.
Then, the PC will bid ci = θi+ti,(1:n) and receive min{Bi,r}−(ti(2:n)+θi) if it is positive and
zero otherwise. As long as θi is known and veriﬁable by the winner SC, the SC beneﬁcially
accepts the payment scheme. Thus, the optimal outcome is implemented.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the optimal mechanism, eﬃciency, and equivalence in the
procurement cost of a procurement auction with pre-award subcontracting. Motivated by the
fact that goods and services are typically produced by a team of ﬁrms (main ﬁrms and subﬁrms)
in many industries, we constructed a Bayesian game in which the lower-tiered subﬁrms and
suppliers are non-negligible players who also possess private information. Then, we found
that, although the aggressive bids of SCs help their PC win if ﬁrst-price auctions are used in
an upstream auction, the double marginalization problem never vanishes. The results show
that the use of neither a ﬁrst- nor a second-price auction in upstream competitions fails to
implement the optimal outcome.
The proposed optimal mechanism in upstream competitions suggests that transactions
between PCs and SCs in practice may be quite complicated, especially in private projects
in which the PC is not selected through the ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction. Moreover, the
cost-minimizing project owner must take care not only of the mechanism of the downstream
market but also of that used in the upstream market, since the auctioneer in the upstream
competition, a PC, may not be better oﬀ by using the optimal mechanism.
Although our framework may shed new light on some practical questions of subcontracting,
there remain many unanswered questions. For instance, the incentive for subcontracting may
not stem from cost reduction. Marechal and Morand (2003) point out that subcontracting
can reduce the risk of potential change orders.13 Given the sheer volume of procurement,
it is clear that more serious research and evaluation are needed to investigate the eﬀect of
subcontracting.
Appendix A
Suppose that there are two types of SCs, exclusive and common.T h e e x c l u s i v e S C s u b m i t s
a subcontract bid to a particular PC, whereas the common SC submits subcontract bids to
13The eﬀect of such ex post changes on procurement contracts is thoroughly analyzed in Bajari and Tadelis
(2001).
11all PCs. Let m ≤ n denote the number of common SCs solicited by each PC. In the ﬁrst
stage, SC (l,j)w i t hl ∈{ 0,i} obtains his cost tl,j and submits a subcontract bid sl,j to PC
i in upstream auction i, and SC (0,j)s u b m i t sN bids to all PCs. Which SC is common or
exclusive is known to PCs. All other settings are the same as those presented in Section 2.
Then, consider a situation in which all SCs other than SC (l,j) follow σ and in which all PCs
follow β. If a common SC (0,j), j =1 ,...,m,b i d ss to PC i,S C( 0 ,j) wins in the upstream
auction with probability P(s), as shown in Section 2. PC i wins in the downstream competition
unless any rival PC accepts a subcontract bid below σ(t0,j). This happens with probability
[1 − Ft(σ−1(s))](n−m)(N−1)1{s≤r}. Since all PCs bid the same amount in this occasion, PC i






The common SC receives a positive payoﬀ with probability NP(·)Qc(·). Hence, the objective
function is identical for both types of SCs.
Appendix B













[1 − Fc(s + θi)]N−1fθ(θi)dθi
, (8)
for any N>1. Let k0 be a positive real number such that
f￿
θ(r−s)








θ(θ)/fθ(θ) − k0 = k(θ), or equivalently f￿
θ(θ)=[ k0 + k(θ)]fθ(θ). Substituting


























g(ˆ θ|·)dˆ θ. Then, for any N>1,














































[1 − Fc(s + ˆ θ)]Nfθ(ˆ θ)dˆ θ
￿ r−s
θ





[1 − Fc(s + ˆ θ)]N−1fθ(ˆ θ)dˆ θ
￿ r−s
θ











[1 − Fc(s + θi]N+1fθ(θi)dθi > 0. Applying the














[1 − Fc(s + ˆ θ)]N−1fθ(ˆ θ)dˆ θ
￿ r−s
θ
[1 − Fc(s + ˜ θ)]N−1fθ(˜ θ)d˜ θ
￿
,
where θ− ∈ [θ
¯
,θ] and θ+ ∈ [θ,r−s]. Since Fc is strictly increasing, the whole terms are strictly
positive. Hence, given s, G(θ|N + 1) is ﬁrst-order stochastically dominated by G(θ|N). Since
k(θi) is non-increasing, −Q￿(s|N,r,σ−i)/Q(s|N,r,σ−i) is strictly increasing in N.
Finally, we show that −
Q￿(s|N,r,σ−i)
Q(s|N,r,σ−i) is weakly decreasing in r. Let r<˜ r. From Equation
(9), we obtain


















[1 − Fc(s + ˜ θ)]N−1fθ(˜ θ)d˜ θ
≤ 0.
It follows that G(θ|N,˜ r) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates G(θ|N,r) and that equality holds




















































g(θ|N,˜ r)dθ =0 .
Together with the fact that k(·) is non-increasing, we obtain the last inequality.
Appendix C
Suppose there exists t such that σ(t|˜ m,·)=σ(t|m,·)=ξ(t). Then, by Equation (7),
￿ ¯ t
t











































14Replacing ˆ s = ξ(ˆ t) and ξ = σ(t) and multiplying by [1 − Ft(ˆ t)]n−1 on both sides will yield
[1 − Ft(ˆ t)]n−1Q(ξ(ˆ t)|˜ m,r,σ−i)
Q(ξ(t)|˜ m,r,σ−i)










[1 − Ft(ˆ t)]n−1Q(ξ(ˆ t)|m,r,σ−i)
Q(ξ(t)|m,r,σ−i)
dˆ t.
Thus, we obtain a contradiction.
Next, suppose by contradiction that there exists t such that σ(t|N,˜ r)=σ(t|N,r)=ξ(t).
Then, by Equation (7),
￿ ¯ t
t







































Replacing ˆ s = ξ(ˆ t) and ξ = σ(t) and multiplying by [1 − Ft(ˆ t)]n−1 on both sides will yield
[1 − Ft(ˆ t)]n−1Q(ξ(ˆ t)|N,r,σ−i)
Q(ξ(t)|N,r,σ−i)










[1 − Ft(ˆ t)]n−1Q(ξ(ˆ t)|N,˜ r,σ−i)
Q(ξ(t)|N,˜ r,σ−i)
dˆ t.
Thus, we have reached a contradiction.
Appendix D
Since σ(t|m) and σ(t|˜ m) never cross each other at t<¯ t for any ˜ m>m≥ 1, σ(t|m)m u s t
be monotone in m, the number of bidders, even if m is a real number instead of an integer.
Suppose by contradiction that σ(t|m) is increasing in m ≥ 1. Then, replacing N with a real
number m in (6) yields
1
σ(t|m,r) − t









The right-hand side is positive if m>1 and vanishes if m = 1. Therefore, if the number




t σ￿(ˆ t|˜ m,·)dˆ t = ¯ t−σ(t|˜ m,·) > ¯ t−σ(t|m,·)=
￿ ¯ t
t σ￿(ˆ t|˜ m,·)dˆ t,i m p l y i n gσ(t|˜ m,·) <σ (t|m,·). A
contradiction is reached.




< ¯ t + θ
¯
≤ r+, suppose by
contradiction that there exists t<¯ t such that σ(t|N,r+) <σ (t|N,r−). Since an SC has no
chance to obtain a job if the reservation price in the downstream auction is equal to r−,h i s
strategy is σ(t|·,r−)=t for all t, whereas if r = r+, then an SC seeks a positive bid margin
when his cost is strictly smaller than ¯ t, i.e., σ(t|·,r+) >tfor any t<¯ t. A contradiction is
reached. Thus, σ(t|N,r) is strictly increasing in r.
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